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THE FAILURE OF FREEDOM: CLASS, GENDER, AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SEGREGATED TRANSIT LAW IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH
PATRICIA HAGLER MINTER*
On August 27, 1881, the Reverend W. H. Gray, a black Baptist
minister travelling to Cincinnati from his home in Lexington, Ken-
tucky, purchased roundtrip first-class tickets over the Cincinnati
Southern Railway.' His wife Silena and their small child accompanied
him. Their trip to Cincinnati proved uneventful; on their return, how-
ever, the brakeman stopped Mrs. Gray as she and her child attempted
to board the first-class coach containing ladies and their gentlemen
escorts. Instead, he directed her toward the forward car containing
only men, most of whom were smoking. Her husband appealed to the
conductor to let his wife and child into the ladies' car, to no avail, and
when pressed for the reason, the conductor cited her race. While her
husband returned home in the smoking car, Mrs. Gray refused to
travel under such circumstances, and upon returning to Cincinnati,
filed suit in federal court against the railroad. The suit, Gray v. Cin-
cinnati Southern Railroad Co., charged that the plaintiff was unlaw-
fully and forcibly prevented from entering the first-class coach "solely
because she was a woman of color,"'2 and as a result was "greatly hin-
dered and delayed in her trip, and deprived of her lawful rights as a
citizen" to accommodations substantially equal to those offered other
female passengers of her status. A Cincinnati jury agreed, awarding
her one thousand dollars in damages.3
The "strange career of Jim Crow," as historian C. Vann Wood-
ward first called the peculiar history of segregation, raises questions
that have been the center of debate for years among scholars. While
* Assistant Professor of History, Western Kentucky University.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the Organiza-
tion of American Historians, where I benefitted greatly from the comments of Michael Les
Benedict, William Wiecek, and Linda C. A. Przybyszewski. Additionally, the author wishes to
thank Paul Finkelman, Charles McCurdy, Edward Ayers, Janette Greenwood, members of the
History Faculty Seminar at Western Kentucky University, and the editors of the Chicago-Kent
Law Review for their suggestions and encouragement at various stages of this project.
1. Gray v. Cincinnati S. R.R. Co., 11 F. 683 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882). See also Indignant,
LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 29, 1881, at 6.
2. Petition and Verdict for Silena J. Gray, Gray, 11 F. 683 (located in National Archives-
Great Lakes Region).
3. 11 F. at 687.
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historians have long agreed that Jim Crow ruled the South by 1900,
they have yet to reach consensus on the reason for its eventual tri-
umph. Woodward argued in his classic work, The Strange Career of
Jim Crow, as well as in Origins of the New South, that de jure or legal-
ized segregation had roots firmly planted in the 1890s, with the major
thrust for codification coming from upper- and middle-class Demo-
crats to appease lower-class whites.4 Revisionists, led first by Joel Wil-
liamson and later Howard N. Rabinowitz, contend that de facto, or
customary, segregation was widespread in the South from the time of
emancipation and never lost strength.5 These two sides generally
dominated the debate on the origins of Jim Crow. 6
4. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, TiE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed.
1966) [hereinafter STRANGE CAREER]; C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH
(1951) [hereinafter ORIGINS]; J. MORGAN KOUSSER, Tan SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLICS: SUF-
FRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974)
(supporting Woodward's belief that the thrust for codification came from upper- and middle-
class Democrats to appease lower-class whites). Several state studies implicitly or explicitly sup-
port the Woodward thesis: GEORGE B. TINDALL, SoUTH CAROLINA NEGROES (1952); CHARLES
E. WYNEs, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA, 1870-1902 (1961); FRENISE A. LOGAN, Tan NEGRO
IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1876-1894 (1964); JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS, 1860-
1880 (1973); Henry P. Dethloff & Robert P. Jones, Race Relations in Louisiana, 1877-1898, in 9
LOUISIANA HISTORY 301-23 (1968); JOHN WILLIAM GRAVES, TOWN AND COUNTRY: RACE RE-
LATIONS IN AN URBAN-RURAL CONTEXT, ARKANSAS, 1865-1905 (1990). Edward L Ayers offers
a new view of this debate that is generally sympathetic to Woodward in THE PROMISE OF THE
NEW SOUTH (1992).
5. Major challenges to the Woodward thesis came first from JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFTER
SLAVERY: Tan NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1877 (1965), as
well as JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLAcK-WHrrE RELATIONS IN THE AMERI-
CAN SoUTm (1984). Howard N. Rabinowitz continued the dissension in RACE RELATIONS IN
THE URBAN SoUTH, 1865-1890 (1978) [herinafter RACE RELATIONS], and More Than the Wood-
ward Thesis: Assessing The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 75 J. AM. HIST. 842-56 (Dec. 1988)
(book review) [hereinafter More Than the Woodward Thesis]. But as John W. Cell points out in
THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: Tan ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE AMERICAN SoUTm (1982), racial segregation by statute must logically be prefaced by
its general acceptance in local custom. While offering no new answers about why Southern
lawmakers perceived a need to codify Jim Crow at a given time, Cell's focus on the rise of
industry and urbanization along with the ascendancy of New South rhetoric provided me with a
starting point for new exploration into the economic origins of segregation law.
Studies of Jim Crow in individual states, while promising, fail to show the relationship be-
tween the political compromises of the 1890s and the social and economic issues related to rail-
road growth in the South. See JOSEPH H. CARTWRIGHT, Tan TRIUMPH OF JIM CROW:
TENNESSEE RACE RELATIONS IN THE 1880s (1976); Linda Matthews, Keeping Down Jim Crow:
The Railroads and the Separate Coach Bill in South Carolina, 74 S. ATLANTIC Q. 117 (Winter
1974).
6. Legal historians have added a third dimension to the debate-the body of case law-yet
they have fallen short in integrating the judge-made evolution of "separate but equal" into the
social, economic, and political context of the region. See CHARLES A. LOFGREN, Tan PLESsY
CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987) and Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Ca-
reer of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the 'Separate but Equal' Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM.
J. LEGAL HIsT. 17 (1984). Even business historians have taken little notice of segregation on
Southern railroads, leaving many questions about the costs of separate cars and company poli-
cies unanswered. See MAURY D. KLEIN, HISTORY OF THE LouISvILLE AND NASHVILLE RAIL-
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The legal separation of the races, however, resulted not only from
changes in statutory law, but also from the evolution of cases, railroad
company rules, and the common law. An examination of several lead-
ing cases challenging railroad segregation further suggests that both
class and gender played key roles in the evolution of the judge-made
"separate but equal" doctrine in the 1880s.7
This Article examines the complex interactions of race, class, and
gender in the New South and their impact on the evolution of segre-
gated railroad transit in the South. By virtue of their class and gender,
many black women successfully secured legal precedents that, for a
short time, protected their sisters from the squalor of the Jim Crow
car. The codification movement of the 1890s, however, effectively ab-
rogated what I have termed "judicial paternalism"-the efforts of
white male judges to protect middle-class black women from the in-
delicacies of male riders of both races. Once states enacted separate
coach statutes, the judiciary could no longer use class and gender as
distinctions for seating patrons on Southern railroads. The elevation
of the idea of race, and its use as the sole determinant for classifying
passengers, relegated all blacks to segregated coaches, regardless of
their gender or social status. A study of these cases also probes the
larger question of why Southern lawmakers perceived the need to
codify Jim Crow, despite the well-established "separate but equal"
doctrine.8 This new body of statutory law, making racial caste instead
of social class or gender the standard for public accommodations, truly
represented the failure of freedom for African Americans little more
than a generation removed from the shackles of slavery.
Not all plaintiffs fared so well in court as Silena Gray. In Septem-
ber 1881, Mrs. Belle Smoot purchased a first-class ticket at the depot
in Paris, Kentucky, on the Kentucky Central Railroad for its regular
passenger train south to Lexington.9 Despite her physical appearance,
described by the Louisville Bulletin as "a well-educated, refined black
ROAD (1972) and JOHN F. STOVER, Tim RAILROADS OF THE SOUTH: A STUDY IN FINANCE AND
CONTROL (1955).
7. Unless otherwise noted, these cases were all brought in federal courts under the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, and after it was declared unconstitutional in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883), under the Fourteenth Amendment.
8. This idea is developed in Patricia H. Minter, The Codification of Jim Crow: The Origins
of Segregated Railroad Transit in the South, 1865-1910 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Virginia).
Tennessee would revise and strengthen its separate coach law in 1891. Five other states
joined the codification movement between 1887 and 1892: Florida (1887), Mississippi (1888),
Texas (1889 and 1891), Georgia (1891), and Kentucky (1892); by 1900, Jim Crow ruled the South.
Id.
9. Smoot v. Kentucky Cent. R.R., 13 F. 337, 340-41 (C.C.D. Ky. 1882).
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lady in every sense of the term ... as fair in complexion as nine out of
ten ladies of Anglo-Saxon origin," both the conductor and the brake-
man refused to allow her to enter the ladies' coach.10 Instead, they
ordered her into the racially mixed smoking car. When she demanded
admission to the first-class accommodations for which she had paid,
the conductor stopped the train between stations and put her off. The
Bulletin, a black newspaper, called her treatment "a high-handed out-
rage," urged her husband to fight the case in court, and suggested all
Kentuckians support their cause." Many of Lexington's black mid-
dle-class citizens heeded this call, holding a meeting on September 13
at the Lexington Court House to raise funds for Mrs. Smoot's suit
against the railroad that refused her entry in the ladies' car. 12
With black public sentiment behind them, the Smoots sought
remedy in federal court, suing for damages under the Civil Rights Act
of 1875.13 In the absence of state laws spelling out the rights of black
passengers, the success or failure of equalization suits in the 1880s fre-
quently turned on the legal strategies employed by counsel for the
aggrieved travellers. For example, Silena Gray's attorney wisely de-
cided to sue on common law grounds instead of the Civil Rights Act.'4
The issue at law in Gray, therefore, was not a civil or a social rights
claim, but whether or not the plaintiff was afforded proper seating as
dictated by the common law concept of reasonableness. 15 However,
the Smoot court held that the prohibitions of the Civil Rights Act ap-
plied only to state action, not to those of individuals such as the con-
ductor or the policymakers 'of the Kentucky Central. Congress,
therefore, had no authority to protect a black woman's right to a seat
in the ladies' coach after the railroad forcibly ejected her.16
The divergent results of Smoot and Gray show that by the late
1880s and 1890s, the judge-made doctrines of the common law could
no longer address the tensions caused by interracial contact on trains.
10. LOUISVILLE BULL, Sept. 24, 1881, at 2.
11. Id.
12. LEXINGTON DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Sept. 13, 1881 (quoted in HAMBLETON TAPP & JAMES
C. KLOTTER, KENTUCKY: DECADES OF DISCoRD, 1865-1900, at 91 n.42 (1977)).
13. Smoot, 13 F. at 341. In addition to citing the state action doctrine articulated implicitly
in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) and explicitly in United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), the opinion draws heavily upon the Charge to the Grand Jury by
Judge Halmer H. Emmons who believed the 1875 Civil Rights Act to be unconstitutional be-
cause Congress had no power under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the right to "full and
equal enjoyment of accommodations" against violation by individuals in a private capacity.
Smoot, 13 F. at 344.
14. See Gray, 11 F. at 685-86.
15. Id.
16. Smoot, 13 F. at 343.
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Antebellum judges, applying a balancing test concerning the "reason-
ableness" of each case, usually compelled black men to ride in racially
mixed second-class smoking cars. Generally, antebellum courts held
that the common law required carriers to provide black passengers
only with a means of transit.17 The individual railroad companies de-
termined the type of accommodation provided and, in practice, this
almost always meant that blacks occupied separate facilities from
white passengers. The leading antebellum case, Day v. Owen,18 used
the doctrine of "reasonableness" in 1858 to uphold the legality of
steamboat regulations excluding blacks from riding in the boat's cabin
and forcing them onto the deck.19
Black women, however, benefitted from judicial paternalism and
usually rode in a separate ladies' coach, protected from the offensive
smoke and whiskey that proliferated in the male-dominated second-
class car. The flexible seating practices afforded by the concept of rea-
sonableness, reflecting the white majority's persistent concern with
caste relations, permitted black servants (most often female nurses)
travelling with their masters to ride in the traditionally all-white first-
class coaches. The 1861 company rulebook for the Memphis and Ohio
Railroad gave conductors no instructions on how to seat male passen-
gers, but explains at length how to make "ladies," presumably white
and free black women, more comfortable during their journey.20 The
rules, however, emphatically state that "conductors are positively for-
bidden to carry slaves without passes"21 signed by their owner and
countersigned by the station agent giving them permission to travel.
This policy dictated similar restrictions for free blacks, requiring a pass
signed by "some respectable white person known to the Station
Agent. ' 22 On the eve of the Civil War, Southern railroad officials,
like many others in the region, clearly exhibited more concern that a
slave would use their line to flee to freedom than they were about any
black passenger, slave or free, occupying a seat near a white customer.
17. EDWARD L. PIERCE, TREATISE ON AMERICAN RAILROAD LAW 489 (1857). See also
Earl M. Maltz, Separate but Equal and the Law of Common Carriers in the Era of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 17 RUTGERS L. J. 553-68 (1984); Joseph G. Hylton, Jr., Jim Crow and the Common
Law, 1840-1900 (1978) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Virginia).
18. 5 Mich. 520 (1858).
19. Id. at 526-27.
20. See MEMPHIS AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
MEMPIs AND Omo RAILROAD COMPANY, EFFECIVE FEBRUARY 25, 1861 (1861) (available in
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Collection, University Archives and Records Center, Univer-
sity of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id.
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The antebellum common law of carriers and the authority of
companies to make distinctions on account of race drew its power
from judge-made law. As such, it was subject to legislative change at
any given time. The revolutionary emancipation of slaves in 1865, as
the Thirteenth Amendment suddenly changed thousands of blacks
from chattel to freedmen, had forced the transformation of the law of
carriers in regard to passenger accommodations. Once blacks became
citizens after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and its equal
protection clause, the judge-made law of common carriers began to
move from mere racial separation to the concept of "separate but
equal." Class and gender, however, continued to influence both rail-
road company policy and opinions from the bench, reflecting the per-
sistence of paternalism in Southern race relations. During
Reconstruction, railroad conductors usually grouped black men into
separate first-class coaches if they paid the higher fare, while black
females rode in the ladies' coach, mirroring the gender-based seating
arrangements available for white travellers. The "separate but equal"
doctrine continued to evolve in a series of decisions between 1867 and
1880: Westchester and Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles23 (1867), Chi-
cago and North Western Railroad Co. v. Williams 24 (1870), Hall v.
DeCuir25 (1878), United States v. Dodge26 (1877), and Green v. City of
Bridgeton27 (1879).
Litigation by black female plaintiffs suggests that the 1880s were
characterized by divergences in racial custom that varied not only
across the region but within the institutions themselves. Silena Gray's
experience on the Cincinnati Southern was probably typical-she sat
23. 55 Pa. 209 (1867). Frequently cited as the first Jim Crow car case, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that while "no one can be excluded from carriage by a public carrier on
account of color," in the absence of contrary statutory authority, the railroad could regulate
seating in this manner. lId at 211. See also Maltz, supra note 17, at 558.
24. 55 Ill. 185 (1870). Plaintiff Anna Williams, a black female, won her case because the
railroad had excluded her from a ladies' car without providing any other accommodations. The
court, building on Miles, found that had a rule been in effect that separated passengers in sub-
stantially equal cars, it would be considered a reasonable regulation. Id. at 189. See also LoF-
GREN, supra note 6, at 122.
25. 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
26. 25 F. Cas. 882 (W.D. Tex. 1877) (No. 14,976). The federal district judge in Texas held
that a railroad employee violated the 1875 Civil Rights Act by denying a black female passenger
a seat in the only car designated for ladies. i at 882. In charging the jury, however, the judge
said that under the 1875 Civil Rights Act, black and white passengers could be separated if there
were two cars equally fit and appropriate. lid at 883.
27. 10 F. Cas. 1090 (S.D. Ga. 1879) (No. 5,754). Green is notable in that its opinion utilized
common law standards in deciding that separate facilities could be substantially equal, com-
pletely ignoring the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Id at 1091. See also LOFOREN, supra note 6, at
135-36.
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in the first class ladies' coach without incident on her trip from Ken-
tucky to Ohio, but encountered hostility from railroad employees and,
ultimately, exclusion on her return.28 Stories told by other black
travellers from the period describe similar inconsistencies in racial eti-
quette. Mary Church Terrell, one of the most prominent African-
American women of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centu-
ries, described a crazy-quilt of railroad seating policies in her autobi-
ography. Travelling home to Memphis from Oberlin College when
she was "about sixteen" (probably 1879 or 1880), Terrell had to
change trains in Bowling Green, Kentucky, and asked the railroad
porter which car she should take to Memphis.29 Neither Tennessee
nor Kentucky had enacted Jim Crow car laws at that point, and ac-
cording to Terrell, blacks who purchased first-class tickets could get
first-class accommodations if they insisted on their rights.30 "As soon
as I had entered the one to which he directed me," she wrote, "I ob-
served that it was different from any coach I had ever seen ... In-
stantly I knew this was the Jim Crow coach which I had never seen but
about which I had heard."'31
According to her description, the car was partitioned into two
parts-the front used as a smoker for white men and the rear serving
as a coach for black passengers of both sexes.32 The angry young wo-
man tried to move to the forward first-class coach for which she had
purchased a ticket, but the conductor sternly told her and several
other unhappy black passengers that "this is first class enough for
you."'33 As night fell and the passengers reached their destinations,
however, Terrell found herself alone in the Jim Crow section "at the
mercy of the conductor or any man who entered." "As young as I
was," she recalled, "I had heard about awful tragedies which had over-
taken colored girls who had been obliged to travel alone on these cars
28. Critics of the Woodward thesis have accused him of treating the 1880s as a "golden age"
of race relations. While this is a misreading, the evidence presented in this paper, particularly
for Tennessee, suggests that the race relations were far less fluid than Woodward believes. In
STRAGE CAREER, he describes a train ride that T. McCants Stewart, a black attorney, took
down the South Atlantic seaboard. Stewart remained in a racially mixed first-class coach for the
entire journey without incident, even when white passengers filled the aisles due to crowding.
STRANGE CAREER, supra note 4, at 38. Howard Rabinowitz has suggested that Stewart's excep-
tionally light skin tone may explain the comfort of his trip. More than the Woodward Thesis,
supra note 5, at 846-47. An alternate explanation attributes his ease to railroad company policy
committed to equal accommodations for all first-class passengers, or more likely, the absence of
aggressively racist employees on that particular line.
29. MARY CHURCH TERRELL, A COLORED WOMAN IN A WHITE WORLD 296 (1980).
30. Id. at 298.




at night," dangers that had originally led railroads to introduce a sepa-
rate ladies' coach.34 Frightened, she once again begged the conductor
to allow her to move to a ladies' coach, only to be angrily rebuffed. In
desperation, she told the conductor that she would get off at the next
stop to wire her father about her plight, assuring the conductor that
her father would sue the railroad for making his daughter ride alone
all night in a Jim Crow car.35 Fortunately, her tactics proved success-
ful, and the conductor ushered Terrell to the ladies' car. She spent the
remainder of the trip exhausted and on the verge of tears, but in the
first-class coach. 36
By the mid-1880s, black women increasingly found themselves
relegated to the squalor of the smoking car, or, in rare instances, a Jim
Crow first-class car. In an interview with a black newspaper editor in
North Carolina, noted black leader and activist Bishop Henry McNeal
Turner described two incidents reflecting the fluctuation of seating
practices across class and gender lines throughout the region. When
asked about the treatment blacks received in the South in the wake of
the Civil Rights Cases, Turner noticed no material changes with the
exception of railroad and steamboat travel. "It matters not how well
dressed we are or how intelligent and refined," he argued. "I know
colored ladies who have been treated in the most brutal manner by
brakemen for refusing to ride in smoking cars, while white female pas-
sengers are treated like queens," regardless of their appearance or so-
cial status. Turner described a trip with his wife from Cleveland,
Tennessee, to Atlanta. On her way from Washington, D.C., Mrs. Tur-
ner rode in the ladies' coach. Once in Cleveland with her husband,
however, they were both ordered by the brakeman into the forward
smoking car. When Turner protested that tobacco smoke would im-
peril his wife's delicate health, she was allowed to remain in the first-
class coach (the only other passengers were two well-dressed white
males), but he rode in the smoker to avert further trouble.37
34. Id. at 297.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 298.
37. NORTH CAROLINA REPUBLICAN, May 22, 1884, at 2 (located in Weldon, N.C.). Turner
recounted another incident in Tennessee involving the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. After
she was refused admission to "any of the first-class cars," Mrs. Sarah Lewis remained on the
platform while the train was in motion rather than sit in the smoker. While attempting to pull
her into a car, the conductor struck her in the face. According to Turner, she entered suit against
the railroad, but I have been unable to find a record of the case.
For additional insight into Turner's activist ideas, see John Dittmer, The Education of Henry
McNeal Turner, in BLACK LEADERS OF TmE NiNETEENTH CENTURY 253-74 (Leon Litwack &
August Meier eds., 1988).
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In addition to Turner's observations, a survey of equalization
suits brought in state and federal courts during the 1880s suggests that
both the class and gender of a black passenger figured prominently in
the selective enforcement of Jim Crow on railroads. In the 1880 fed-
eral case of Brown v. Memphis and C. R. Co.,38 Miss Jane Brown was
removed from the first-class coach and forced to ride in the racially
mixed smoker. In her pleadings, Brown argued that not only was she
entitled to ride in the ladies' car by the common law doctrine of rea-
sonableness, but she also claimed that the Memphis and Charleston
had a regulation excluding blacks from the better coach. The opinion
does not clarify why Brown believed the railroad had such a policy,
and the company denied its existence. Instead, the conductor justified
excluding her from the first-class car and seating her in the smoker on
the grounds that "she was not a respectable person," either a prosti-
tute or a member of a lower class. Despite the negative charges con-
cerning her moral character, the court record indicated that Miss
Brown had conducted herself "with propriety." From this evidence,
the court determined that the plaintiff's exclusion was based not on
her color, but upon her questionable reputation. This, the court held,
was not an adequate basis for exclusion from first-class accommoda-
tions. Brown recovered $3,000 in damages from the railroad
company.39
The Brown case demonstrated the confused nature of Southern
paternalism and class relations in the 1880s. Exclusions defended on
the basis of class or character instead of race would meet with great
difficulty in the courts. The adoption of the "separate but equal" stan-
dard for accommodations allowed white paternalists to retain their
concern for class status without fear of advocating social equality.
Many paternalistic judges, while not openly advocating separate-but-
equal facilities for blacks, accepted this arrangement as a solution for
what they believed to be the popular antipathies of lower-class whites.
Instructing a white jury in a civil rights case, a federal district judge in
Tennessee found that "those who are sensitive as to contact with
colored people, and whose nerves are most shocked by their presence,
have little to be proud of in the way of birth, lineage, or achieve-
ment. '40 While his opinion upheld the assignment of black men to
38. 5 F. 449 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880).
39. Id. at 503. The case, however, did not provide an effective precedent for the "separate
but equal" doctrine because the decision addressed the legality of exclusion based upon social
standing, not skin color.
40. Murphy v. Western and A. R.R., 23 F. 637, 639 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1885).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
facilities separate from white passengers, the judge insisted that those
of "genteel appearance, good repute, and good behavior" who had
paid first-class fare could not be assigned to "inferior quarters in a
smoking car."' 41 The rule of law would protect the "better" class of
blacks from the crude prejudices of lower-class whites while shielding
the "better" whites from the perceived crudeness of most blacks.
In the absence of statutes mandating segregation, the idea of such
laws did hold some appeal for those Southerners concerned about the
issues of racial caste and economic class. The contact between the
lower-class whites riding in the "smokers" and blacks who, frequently,
enjoyed a higher class status than their white fellow-travellers, led
many poor whites to agitate for Jim Crow laws that would prevent
such uncomfortable racial confrontations. One black middle-class ob-
server bemoaned the demise of the close interracial contact that had
existed during slavery, asking "Now that we are free, why give us
worse treatment?" This writer recognized, however, that some whites
thought it would be a mistake to "treat a decent Negro right" for fear
"others would want to be treated the same way." To these whites, he
argued that "all we want is the treatment we merit"-that refined,
well-educated citizens would be accorded the accommodations they
could afford which would then distinguish them from servile members
of both races.42 For those whites who supported segregation, this was
exactly the point.
The increased class tensions cut both ways-one black minister
advised "decent" blacks to accept first-class Jim Crow accommoda-
tions since "I would prefer a seat... with those by whom I could be
The idea that poor whites were the group most concerned with the increased social and
political presence of the growing black middle-class is at the heart of the "Woodward Thesis."
Both in ORIGINS OF THE NEW SouTH and SnoANG CAREER, C. Vann Woodward places poor
white Southerners squarely in the middle of racial tensions in the New South. He argues that
segregation laws, and later disenfranchisement provisions, were gifts given to the white yeomen
by their more affluent counterparts who controlled the state legislatures. See generally OaIINs,
supra note 4; STAoE CAREER, supra note 4.
While I do not doubt that the elite white men of the Southern bench sincerely believed that
poor whites "who have little to be proud of" were the group who most resented the presence of
well-dressed black travellers, my work on segregation law shows that they were not the only
white Southerners who harbored these antipathies. Furthermore, poor whites did not assume
leadership in the movement to enact Jim Crow laws. Instead, a new generation of middle-class
white politicians created the specter of "Negro Supremacy" and used it with great effectiveness
to regain dominance in Southern legislatures in the 1890s. Jim Crow, then, may have had the
support of lower-class white Southerners but it was a distinctly middle-class creation, not a
movement from the bottom up. See Minter, supra note 8, at chs. 3-5 and conclusion.
41. Murphy, 23 F. at 640. See also CARTWIor, supra note 5, at 167-68.
42. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 5, at 187 (quoting NASHVILLE AM., Oct. 6, 1881).
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cordially entertained. '43 He deeply resented being "crowded upon by
base and reckless beings" in the racially mixed smoker, his erudition
ignored in favor of his skin color." In 1881, one year after Brown, the
Tennessee legislature passed the first law mandating separate-but-
equal railroad cars for first-class passengers, the initial codification of
Jim Crow in the South. The law was in large part a reaction to Brown
and other cases in which variations in company seating policies on
common carriers made clear the need for one definitive rule. In fact,
the legislature viewed this law as a step forward for race relations in
the state. By requiring railroads to supply first-class accommodations
for blacks, legislators hoped to prevent situations like those described
by Brown and the black minister.4 5
The Supreme Court's 1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases46
further complicated the matter of separate coaches and the issue of
equality. In this decision, the Court struck down the 1875 Civil Rights
Act as unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Joseph
Bradley held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited only state
abridgement of individual rights.47 The 1875 Act, because it reached
into the realm of public accommodations such as railroad cars, restau-
rants, and inns, was an impermissible attempt to regulate the private
conduct of individuals in the area of racial discrimination. 48 Bradley
argued that to interpret the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
otherwise would be to make blacks "the special favorite of the
laws."'49 The Court had now created a firmer legal base for Tennes-
see's pioneering separate coach statute.
The racial climate in the state during the 1880s, however, would
be characterized more by the fluidity of race relations rather than by
the hardening of the color line. The idea that black middle- and up-
per-class women would be forced to endure these indignities weighed
heavily not only upon black men, but also on the paternalistic white
judges of the state and federal benches. Furthermore, the continued
43. Riegel, supra note 6, at 26. See generally RACE RELATIONS supra note 5, for a descrip-
tion of black relegation to smoking cars.
44. Riegel, supra note 6, at 26.
45. An Act to prevent discriminations by railroad companies among passengers who are
charged and paying first class passage, and fixing penalty for the violation same, ch. 155, 1881
Tenn. Pub. Acts 211. For a detailed discussion of the framing and context of the region's first
Jim Crow railroad law, see Minter, supra note 8, ch. 3.
46. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
47. Id. at 11.
48. Id. at 18-19.
49. l& at 25. The case is also discussed in OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
149 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
use of a ladies' coach as the primary form of first-class railroad accom-
modation facilitated equalization suits filed by female plaintiffs in-
stead of their male counterparts. Accordingly, the majority of
successful lawsuits during this period involved middle-class black wo-
men whose reputations were above reproach.
The 1883 case of Wells v. Chesapeake, Ohio, and Southwestern
R.R. Co. is illustrative. Miss Ida B. Wells, a young Memphis school-
teacher who later gained national prominence as a journalist and mili-
tant crusader against lynching, purchased a first-class ticket from
Memphis to Woodstock, Tennessee, and took a seat in the ladies'
coach. The conductor then asked her to move to the forward car, oc-
cupied by members of both races. When she refused, the conductor
attempted to force her from her seat, "a mistake he quickly realized
when he felt a vice-like bite on the back of his hand." 50 The conduc-
tor, enlisting the aid of two other white males, dragged the petite
young woman out of the car.5'
Two contemporary accounts of the incident emphasize the impor-
tance of class issues to Wells. In her autobiography, Wells expressed
disgust at the thought of riding in a car "filled with colored people and
those who were smoking," since the better class of whites sat else-
where.52 A later retelling in a black newspaper gave an angry descrip-
tion of her ejection by "three rough white men."'53 When Shelby
County Circuit Court Judge James 0. Pierce, finding that the smoking
car did not constitute equal accommodations to the first-class ladies
coach, awarded Wells five hundred dollars in damages, the Memphis
Daily Appeal ran the headline, "A Darky Damsel Obtains a Verdict for
Damages... What It Cost to Put a Colored School Teacher in a Smok-
50. PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON
RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 22 (1984).
51. CARTWRIGrr, supra note 5, at 189-91; see also CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: Tim AUTOBIOG-
RAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS 18-20 (Alfreda Duster ed., 1970) [hereinafter CRUSADE]. By Wells's
account, there were no Jim Crow cars as such in 1884, but there were sporadic efforts throughout
the region to draw the color line on railroads. Id. at 18.
52. CRUSADE, supra note 51, at 18-19.
53. INDIANAPOLIS FREEMAN, July 20, 1889, at 4. The use of the phrase "three rough white
men" in the 1889 retelling shows the way stories reflect the views of those who tell them: no-
where in the case files does anyone, including Wells, testify that the three men who removed her
were "roughs" or even of a lower social class. Given the beliefs that middle-class blacks such as
the editor of the Freeman held about class solidarity between the black and white "better
classes," it is not surprising that they would make such an assumption about the men who mis-
treated Wells. This mistaken trust in their white counterparts represents one of the greatest
tragedies in the saga of the codification of Jim Crow. This theme is explored in depth in Minter,
supra note 8. See also JANETrE THOMAS GREENWOOD, BITrERSWEET LEGACY: THE BLACK
AND WHITE BET-ER CLASSES IN CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA (1994) for a detailed analysis
of class formation and the disillusionment of Charlotte's black "better" class.
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ing Car." While condescending in tone, the Daily Appeal expressed
dismay at the violent treatment an educated young woman received at
the hands of white men.54
Wells's attorneys, two of whom were white, further addressed the
class issue in their appellate brief. Accepting the principle of racial
separation as mandated by state law, but insisting on equality of ac-
commodation, they urged the court not to pander to popular
prejudices. If a Negro had to be a servant or nurse in order to obtain
first-class accommodations, blacks faced the ludicrous prospect of
finding that their privileges increased as they sank lower on the social
scale.55
Two witnesses in Wells also raised the issue of servitude in their
depositions. Virginius and Allene Kimbrough, a white couple travel-
ling on the ladies' car to Memphis, occupied seats adjacent to Wells at
the time of her ejection. The Kimbroughs testified that when they
boarded the train they noticed Wells sitting next to Mrs. Wendell, a
white woman they recognized. When asked if he objected at first to
sharing the ladies' coach with "a colored woman," Mr. Kimbrough
replied that he did not because he "thought she was Mrs. Wendell's
nurse until the controversy arose about the seat." Once they realized
that Wells was not in the service of a white passenger, however, Mrs.
Kimbrough recalled telling her to "get away... I was not in the habit
of sitting on the seat with negroes. ' 56
In April 1887, the Tennessee Supreme Court handed down its de-
cision in Wells, and the opinion clearly showed that judicial paternal-
ism on gender issues had its limits. The state's highest court reversed
the lower court's decision, finding in favor of the railroad and requir-
ing Wells to pay court costs. 57 Believing that Wells's goal was integra-
tion instead of equalization, Chief Justice Peter Turney concluded that
"the purpose of the defendant in error was to harass with a view to
this suit, and that her persistence was not in good faith to obtain a
comfortable seat for the short ride."58 Turney's language in the opin-
54. MEMPIS DAILY APPEAL, Dec. 25, 1884, at 4.
55. Brief for Plaintiff, Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613
(1887) (located in Supreme Court Case Files, Tennessee State Library, Nashville, Tennessee).
56. Statements of Virginius and Allene Kimbrough, Wells, 85 Tenn. 613, at 50-52. (located
in Wells case files).
57. See generally Wells, 85 Tenn. 613.
58. Wells, 85 Tenn. at 615. In 1881, Tennessee enacted the South's first separate coach law,
and in the initial Wells decision, the court found that the railroad had not met its obligation
under the law to provide equal accommodations for black women. On appeal, Wells questioned
the constitutionality of an 1875 state law abrogating the common law of public accommodations,
a statute designed to circumvent the 1875 Civil Rights Act. See An Act to define the rights,
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ion also suggests his displeasure with Wells's aggressive, even un-lady-
like, conduct in pursuing the case. Despite this reversal, Wells's
persistence in pursuing the case established an important precedent-
no other black plaintiff had appealed a separate coach case to a South-
ern state supreme court since the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the
Civil Rights Act in 1883. What Wells made abundantly clear, how-
ever, was that the separate-but-equal standard was by no means a
guarantor of legal redress for black plaintiffs.
By the mid-1880s, as Tennessee's Jim Crow law (the region's only
separate coach statute until 1887) remained unevenly enforced and
the U.S. Supreme Court's invalidation of the 1875 Civil Rights Act
removed the spectre of federal intervention on social rights, class ten-
sions continued to fester between the growing black middle class and
the poor whites with whom they shared the smoking cars. An edito-
rial in 1885 charged that black railroad patrons were usually "shoved
into filthy smoking cars, where decent colored women and their chil-
dren are strangled by tobacco smoke and insulted by white loafers." 59
The 1885 case of Logwood v. Memphis and C. R.60 emphasizes the
importance that members of both the black community and the elite
white men of the federal bench placed on protecting middle- and up-
per-class women from those persons of questionable character. Their
judicial paternalism, drawing its power from the common law stan-
dard of reasonableness, found expression in the affirmation of the
"separate but equal" doctrine. Logwood also indicates that during the
1880s many blacks were more concerned with sitting in comfortable
first-class accommodations and avoiding second-class passengers of
both races than they were with sitting with whites.
The plaintiff was a "proper black woman" 61 who chose to get off
the train rather than sit in the racially mixed car where "swearing and
smoking and whiskey drinking" 62 proliferated. Taking Mrs. Log-
duties and liabilities of inn-keepers, common carriers, and proprietors of places of public amuse-
ment, ch. 130, 1875 Tenn. Pub. Acts 216. For a more elaborate discussion of the intent of the
Tennessee legislature, see Minter, supra note 8, ch. 3; CARTWRIGHT, supra note 5.
59. NASHVILLE AMERICAN, July 30, 1885 (quoted in CARTWRIGHT, supra note 5, at 168).
60. 23 F. 318 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1885). The opinion is adopted from the holding in The Sue,
22 F. 843 (D. Md. 1885), an admiralty case involving a black female plaintiff. This affirmation of
the "separate but equal" doctrine would remain the leading federal case until Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). The issues in Logwood involving gender and reasonable accommodations
are also raised in Murphy v. Western and A. R. R., 23 F. 637 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1885) and Houck
v. Southern Pac. Ry., 38 F. 226 (C.C.W.D. Texas 1888). For a discussion of Logwood in the
context of all lower federal court decisions involving plaintiffs of both sexes, see Riegel, supra
note 6.
61. Riegel, supra note 6, at 26.
62. 23 F. at 318.
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wood's race, gender, and economic position into consideration, a fed-
eral judge decreed that if "a car with special privileges of seclusion
and other comforts" existed for white ladies, the same rights must be
established for proper black ladies to shield them from the crudeness
of the lower classes of both races.63 In his charge to the jury, the judge
outlined the basic assumptions of the separate but equal doctrine-
that "races and nationalities, under some circumstances, to be deter-
mined on the facts of the case, may be reasonably separated; but in
all cases the carrier must furnish substantially the same accommoda-
tions to all, by providing equal comforts, privileges, and pleasures to
every class." 64 Lower federal court rulings in other public accommo-
dations cases showed a uniformity of principle summed up by a phrase
from Logwood: "Equal accommodations do not mean identical
accommodations. 65
The cases discussed here show that class struggles further exacer-
bated the strains created by racialist 66 ideology, and these two forces
frequently collided on passenger cars travelling through the New
South. Many rural lower-class whites experienced close contact with
prosperous urban blacks for the first time on racially mixed smoking
cars. Their anger and discomfort over their economic plight translated
into the language of white supremacy in the late 1880s and 1890s.
Even old-line Bourbon Democrats, formerly the paternalistic patrons
of freedmen and women, were growing uncomfortable with the strug-
gle by upwardly mobile blacks to achieve power in Southern society.
This sentiment echoed throughout the New South. One South Caro-
lina state senator supported the separate coach law to protect whites
not from "good old farm hands and respectable Negroes" but from
"that insolent class of Negroes who desired to force themselves into
first class coaches. 67
63. Id. at 319.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. The term "racialist" is used here instead of "racist." In her insightful essay, "Ideology
and Race in American History," Barbara J. Fields argues persuasively that race should be, like
class, treated as an ideology of varying importance across space and time. See Barbara J. Fields,
Ideology and Race in American History, in RACE, REGION, AND RECONSTRucnON: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF C. VANN WOODWARD (J. Morgan Kousser & James M. McPherson eds., 1982).
67. CHARLESTON NEWS AND COURIER, Feb. 16, 1898 (quoted in Matthews, supra note 5, at
128).
The term "Bourbon" in Southern history was usually used as an epithet, referring to con-
servative Democrats who eschewed the changes the New South disciples pushed. The name
refers to the royal House of Bourbon in post-revolutionary France who refused to recognize the
changes that the Revolution had wrought. See AYERS, supra, note 4; ORIGINS, supra note 4.
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Conversely, members of the emerging black middle class felt de-
graded and confused by the refusal of white society, particularly those
with whom they equated themselves, to recognize the station they had
worked hard to attain. One black minister referred to Kentucky's
1891 Jim Crow bill as "the worst species of class legislation which he
did not believe the better class of white people would sanction. '68
A plea from the editor of the New Orleans Crusader concerning
the Louisiana separate coach bill indicates how many Southerners,
both black and white, conflated segregation with class and gender sta-
tus. Not only would the members themselves be relegated to the Jim
Crow car, the editor warned, but their families would become social
outcasts and their daughters would be doomed to prostitution.69
Although this writer's fear of debauchery would prove unfounded, his
gravest fears about separate coach laws would soon be realized.
The codification movement of the 1890s both in Tennessee and in
other Southern states effectively nullified judicial paternalism as stat-
utes replaced common law balancing tests. This relegated all black
passengers to segregated coaches regardless of their gender or social
status. The ladies' car continued to be the preferred seating area for
white females; however, the railroad accommodations available for
black "ladies" continued to vary across the South. First-hand ac-
counts from Virginia in the early 1890s indicate that black women
rode in the ladies' coach without incident, an observation consistent
with the relatively late passage of the state's separate coach law.70 By
contrast, in 1889 an anonymous black resident of Birmingham, Ala-
bama, described seeing conductors and brakemen assisting white la-
dies onto a train, while black female passengers had to scramble up by
"the best way they could, and were driven into the smoking car after-
wards." According to the same writer, a black man travelling on a
through ticket from Cincinnati was welcome to ride in the ladies'
coach until he reached the Alabama state line. He would then be told
"by the ruffian of a brakeman" to go to the "cullud car, and a cullud
68. THE HISTORY OF THE ANTI-SEPARATE COACH MOVEMENT OF KENTUCKY (S.E. Smith
ed., 1895) (located in Special Collections, Kentucky State University Library, Frankfort, Ken-
tucky). Smith's book provides a detailed first-hand account of black middle class outrage over
the Jim Crow law he describes as an "uncalled for, unjust, and prejudiced piece of class
legislation."
69. INDIANAPOLIS FREEMAN, May 31, 1890, at 6 (reprint from NEW ORLEANS CRUSADER
editorial).
70. WYNES, supra note 4, at 73. Virginia enacted its Jim Crow law in 1900, the last former
Confederate state to do so.
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car it is, for every complexion, nationality, and odor greets the eyes,
nose, and ear."'71
By 1896, all but three states of the former Confederacy had en-
acted separate coach laws, and the United States Supreme Court's af-
firmation of the "separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson
effectively removed any judicial impediment to their enforcement. 72
By the turn of the century, Jim Crow was firmly entrenched in every
Southern state. Because many of these statutes mandated stiff penal-
ties for non-compliant railroads, companies tightened their enforce-
ment policies throughout the region. The company rulebook issued to
conductors on the Louisville & Nashville railroad shows that by 1909
no black woman, regardless of fare paid, could ride in a separate la-
dies' coach; instead, the L&N authorized only one passenger car per
train for use by "all colored passengers." The ladies' car, however,
still remained available for white women.73
The advent of the Jim Crow era then, signified the failure of free-
dom for African-Americans. It marked the beginning of oppression
based on race and color-on racial caste instead of social class or gen-
der. With all vestiges of protection they had possessed stripped away
by the codification of Jim Crow, the black middle-class women of the
New South would suffer more acutely than ever from the hardening of
the color line.
71. INDIANAPOLIS FREEMAN, Sept. 28, 1889. Alabama did not enact a separate coach law
until 1891.
72. The remaining three, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, enacted Jim Crow
laws in 1898, 1899, and 1900, respectively.
73. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, Rules for the Government of the Operating
Department 156 (1909) (located in Rare Books, Alderman Library, University of Virginia). The
Southern Railway System Rulebook of 1899 does not contain a separate coach regulation, nor
does the Chesapeake & Ohio rulebooks of 1899 and 1907. The Alabama & West Point Railroad
Company and The Western Railway of Alabama are the only other railroads to include a Jim
Crow regulation for conductors to follow.
